We consider the impact of domestic antidumping law in a two-country partial equilibrium model where domestic and foreign firms tacitly cDllude in the domestic market.
I. Introduction
The belief that dumping on foreign markets is closely linked to cartelization is nearly as old as the issue of dumping in international trade itself. This view played a critical role in the evolution of antiduaping laws in the early 20th century. 'liner (1966, p.242) notes, for instance, that the first antidumping legislation adopted in the U.S., as contained in Sections 800-801 of the Revenue Act of 1916, came largely in response to the alleged dumping threat from the highly cartelized and heavily protected German industries. This alleged duiping activity took the form of unloading excess industrial capacity from the German cartels on to the noncartelized (and segmented) U.S. market, Inspired by this fear, the original intent of the law was to provide protection for U.S. firms against unfair competition" resulting from the dumping activity of cartelized firms abroad.
While the importance of cartels in the evolution of antidumping law is widely acknowledged, the impact of such laws on the performance of cartels is less well understood.1
Yet, antidumping law is likely to alter the environment within which cartels operate in important ways. For example.
in the particular duaping context discussed above, the introduction of antidumping law into the domestic country will effect the freedom with which cartelized foreign finis can dump excess capacity on the noncartelized domestic market. This, in turn, may have an important impact on the degree of collusion sustainable by the foreign cartel. Moreover, when made available to cartel meters, antidumping law may become a tool to enforce 1 collusion. The Second International Steel Cartel of the 1930s, for example.
exploited the existence of antidumping law to police the dumping activities of its own members in cartelized markets. In at least one instance.
antidumping action was used successfully by one member of the International Steel Cartel against another to enforce the cartels price arrangements.2
The impact of antidumping laws on collusive behavior thus seems to be a potentially fruitful area of research, and one that we begin to explore in this paper. We do so in the context of an environment where firms collude tacitly and are limited to self-enforcing arrangements. The general setting we choose is one of an infinitely repeated game in which firms face stochastic market demand and must choose each period's capacity before the market demand for the period is realized. Once market demand for the period has been observed, and with their capacities for the period now fixed, firms then simultaneously choose prices. Within this setting, fins attempt to enforce collusion over capacity and price with the credible (subgame perfect) threat to forever revert to the static Nash equilibrium in the event of a defection from the cooperative arrangement.3 The 'lost collusive 2 In January 1938, the South African Iron and Steel Corporation filed an antidumping petition against steel producers in the U.S. for selling steel in the South African market at prices below those agreed upon by the International Steel Cartel. Dumping duties were levied and the Cartel's pricing arrangements restored (see Hexner, 1943) .
Our model can be viewed essentially as either an infinitely repeated version of Kreps and Scheinkinan (1983) with firms facing stochastic market demand that is realized only after capacity is set for the period, or as a variation on Rotewberg and Saloner (1986a) with the introduction of a capacity-setting stage at the start of each period. Related work on pricesetting supergames with capacity constraints but without stochastic demand can be found in Brock and Scheinlcman (1985) , Benoit and Krishna (1987) , and Davidson and Deneckere (1987) , among others. See also Rotenberg and Saloner (l986b) for an analysis of the impact of import quotas on collusive behavior. equilibrium will, typically have firms carrying excess capacity in low demand states, and it is with respect to this excess capacity that antidumping tatc has its effects.
The observations on antidumping law made at the outset suggest that, in the presence of tacit collusive behavior, the introduction of antidumping law may have very different effects depending on the competitive characteristics of the industry to which the law is made available.
In Staiger and golak (1989) , we consider the case in which the domescic industry is competitive but faces imports from firms behaving collusively in a segmented market abroad. In that paper, we show that the introduction of domestic antidumping law is likely to lead to the filing of antidumping suits and the imposition of antiduniping duties in low demand states, to less price collusion abroad, and to a lesser quantity duuiped on the domestic market as a result.
In the present paper, we consider the impact of the introduction of antidumpiug law into the domestic country when domestic and foreign firms are tacitly colluding in the domestic market. Here we show that the introduction of antidumping law into the domestic country typically leads to the filing of antidumping suits by the domestic industry in low demand states, and to more successful collusion and greater market share for domestic firms during periods of low demand as a result. This occurs in spite of the fact that antidumping duties are never actually imposed. That is, in this setting, and as distinct from the use of antidumping law by coapetitive industries analyzed in Statger and ¶Jolak (1989) , the entire effect of antidumping law comes in the form of a threat to punish foreign firms with a duty if they should "misbehave", Such a threat is made 3 credible by filing the suit and, because it is credible, never has to be implemented.' The results then follow from the fact chat by filing an antidumping suit, the domestic industry is able to diminish the incentives of foreign firms to aggressively pursue domestic market share. i.e.
• defect from the collusive price arrangement. Hence, with defection now relatively less attractive fur foreign firms, higher collusive prices in periods of low demand can be sustained with the filing of an antidumping suit, but only after appeasing the domestic industrys incentive to defect by giving domestic firms a larger share of the low-demand market. These results are developed fornally below.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. In section II we develop the model in the absence of antiduanping law. Section III introduces antidumping law into the domestic country and explores the consequences for collusive behavior. Finally. section IV concludes with a summary of our results.
II. The Model
We consider an infinitely repeated model of two firms, home (no *) and foreign (*), selling to the home market where demand is stochastic and fluctuates between high and low states. At the beginning of any period, firms first must simultaneously set capacity K and K*. facing per unit capacity costs r>O. Once capacity choices for the period are made, the state of demand for the period is revealed. We assume for simplicity that demand takes the linear form -This prediction is consistent with the large number of antidumping suits that are filed and then later withdrawn (see Prusa, 1988 , and section III below).
with price as a function of home and foreign supplies q and q*, respectively, then given by
We assume that high demand occurs in any period with probability p. After observing the demand realization for the period, the two firms then simultaneously set prices facing zero marginal costs of production (up to capacity).
The Static Nash Eouilibriu We first characterize the unique static Nash equilibrium to this game which will serve as the credible (subgame perfect) punishment in the repeated game to be studied next. We rely heavily on Kreps and Scheinkrnan (1983) and therefore on the particular (efficient) rationing rule underlying their results, Specifically, consumers buy first from the cheapest supplier, and income effects from price changes are absent.3
Provided that (in a sense to be formalized) the differential between high demand and low demand is sufficiently great, there exists a unique Nash equilibrium to the static game characterized by symmetric capacity choices See Davidson and Deneckere (1986) for results from a static twostage game under different rationing rules. Thus, capacity choices are such that in high demand states, the two firms sell their capacity at the market clearing price, while in low demand states, price is set to marginal cost (which equals zero) and there is excess capacity.
To show that this is indeed the unique Nash equilibrium to the static game (under the condition of sufficiently large differences between high and low demand states), we follow Kreps and Scheinkman (1g83) and first define q1(q) i-L,M as the Cournot duopoly best response functions for firms facing the linear demand function given in (1) and zero marginal costs. It is straightforward to check that these best response functions must satisfy the following sets of inequalities:
where the notation q(qax) denotes the value of q(q) for all values of q t x. Moreover, the symmetric Cournot-Nash equilibrium output choice facing high demand (and zero marginal costs), q, is given by°E
Thus, using (2) and (7), and provided p is strictly positive.
K" < q.
It thus follows that
Finally, we assume that the differential between high demand and low demand is sufficiently great in the sense that
which, using (1) and (2). implies0
Putting (S), (6), (8). and (10) together yields
With (11) (12) . it must be true that
The first inequality is a direct consequence of (12) and the second inequality follows from (11). Appealing to Proposition 1(a) of Kreps and Scheinkman (1983) , we then have that capacity responses satisfying (12) Condition (9) is in fact more than enough to yield (10), but will be needed for uniqueness. S yield high-demand revenues for the firm of P(K+K")K: each firm sells its entire capacity at the market clearing price.
Alternatively, if realized demand is low, then by (U) and (12)
Under (14) that the finns revenues with high demand will be its "Staclcelberg follower'
revenues Pfi(q(K") + K') q(KN) when (16) holds. Thus, expected profits for capacity responses to 1(11 in the range given by (16) are
with (17) Therefore, it will never pay the firm to respond to K" with a K that violates, the right-hand inequality of (12).
Finally, consider the range of firm capacity responses to K" corresponding to
Together, (11) and (18) imply that (1.3) continues to hold, so that firm revenues with high demand will be P5(K+K").K. Suppose, then, that demand is low. Together, (11) and (18) imply
Appealing once more to Proposition 1(b) of Kreps and Scheinkman (1983) . we then have that the firm's revenues with low demand will be no greater than its rival's staclcelberg follower" revenues P(K+q(K))q(K) when (18) holds. Thus, expected profits for capacity responses to K" in the range given by (18) 
Essentially, assumption (9) assures that high demand states are of sufficient importance to the expected profits of the firm that it would never find profitable a reduction of capacity for the purpose of generating higher Nash profits in low demand states. Hence, under assumption (9) it will never pay the firm to respond to x' with a K that violates the left-hand inequality of (12).
We are thus left with (15) as the portion of the firm's expected profit function relevant to finding the best response to K'. To find this best response to K', the first order conditions of (IS) can be solved to yield (2), with (3) and (4) then following from the preceding discussion. This establishes that (2), (3) and (4) characterize a Nash equilibrium to the static game provided that the difference between high and low demand is sufficiently great (in the sense of (9)). Uniqueness then follows directly by using th. preceding arguments to rule out the existence of additional equilibria characterized by mm (K,K*) t DL(O). and by using (9) and a sligbt variation on the preceding arguments to rule out the existence of 11 equilibria characterized by mEn (K,K*) c DL(O).'
The Monoocly Solution
Before tuning to the dynamic game, we consider the monopoly solution to the static game above. This will provide the collusive ideal toward which the two firms will strive in the repeated setting of the next subsection.
The monopolists problem is much simpler than the duopoly examined above since it does not involve a price setting game subject to capacity constraints. The problem is simply to choose capacity facing uncertain demand, and then upon the realization of demand for the period to choose the profit maximizing quantity to sell subject to the constraint that quantity delivered be no greater than capacity.
Consider first the choice of output given a low demand realization.
Low demand profits (revenues) as a function of output q are given by (21) I4(q) -P(q)q.
The monopolists unconstrained profit maximizing quantity choice if the demand realization is low is, from the first-order condition of (21), given by q-a./2. Because the monopolist can sell at most its capacity K. the constrained quantity choice is characterized by
The variation involves replacing K' with K" (defined by (24) -min(K,°1 2
Thus, expected monopoly profits as a function of capacity choice K are given
which is strictly concave in K.
Assuming IC > aLl2, so that capacity does not bind in low demand states, the first order condition for maximizing (22) Is Note that (2) and (24) imply I -(3/2)K". Finally, assumption (9) ensures that I > a,_/2 as assumed in the derivation of (24). Thus. be monopoly solution has K" chosen such that in high demand states aid capacity is utilized, while in low demand states there exists excess capacity.
The Dynamic Case
We are now ready to characterize the dynamic game. We explore an infinitely repeated version of the static game described above. The two firms achieve the most collusive (syiimetric) outcome sustainable by the credible (subgame perfect) threat to revert forever to the static Nash equilibrium characterized above in the event that either firm defects. In order to focus on the dynamics of sustaining collusion in a stochastic environment, we will maintain assumptions which allow the firms to sustain their most preferred capacity choice. Thus, any difficulties in sustaining full collusion will occur with regard to the pricing decisions, which by assumption, are made once demand for the period has been observed. We begin by deriving the conditions under which the fully collusive capacity and price choices are sustainable by the threat of Nash reversion.
14 The Fully Collusive Ecuilibrium
In the fully collusive equilibrium, firms make symmetric capacity choices Kc and pricing decisions to replicate the monopoly outcome of the previous subsection, so that
where "s denote fully collusive magnitudes. If full collusion is sustainable, then neither firm can have an incentive to unilaterally defect from the cooperative choices characterized by (27) . (28), and (29). Because both firms are completely symmetric, we characterize the no defection" condition in the domestic finn notation. A firm may defect from the cooperative agreement either in its capacity choice or in its price choice.
The former defection can not be conditioned on the state of demand (which is unknown at the time), while the latter defection can be conditioned on the demand realization for the period. We consider each in turn.
If the domestic firm unilaterally defects from its cooperative capacity choice I, it will face noncooperative pricing in the second stage of the current period, followed by infinite repetition of the noncooperative Nash equilibrium characterized earlier. Denoting the defection capacity as 1(0, assumption (9) On the other hand, defection capacity choices K° > q(K') in response to a foreign capacity choice of t can be ruled out as long as r>0 in an exactly analogous way that capacity choices K > q(K") in response to a foreign capacity choice of 1(2 were ruled out in the static game. Hence we also have
which (appealing once more to Proposition 1(a) of Kreps and Scheinkman (1983)) assures that K and 1(0 are such that in high demand states the two firms will sell all of their capacity at the market clearing price.
Thus, a firms current expected gain from defecting to 1(0 in the relevant range is given by 
Now consider a defection from the cooperative price, with the defection price denoted by P i-L.H. In the hIgh demand state, defection must entail raising one's price above P, since each firm sells its entire capacity at P. In the low demand state, defectiot entails shaving ones price just below P. using (9).
so that a firm that defects by shaving its price below P will have sufficient capacity to capture the entire market, With this, the firm's 11 current gain to defecting from will then be given by
where Q(P,P) has the defecting firm facing a nonnegative residual demand and making sales equal to the minimum of this and its capacity.
The optimal defection price P will be chosen to maximize (33 (34) and (35), only in this state is the current gain from price defection strictly positive. In the event that low demand states are associated with less than fully collusive pricing given capacity RM/2, it is possible that a choice of cooperative capacity K° < K"/2 will yield higher cooperative profits for the firms, but only if the smaller capacity choice helps to sustain a more collusive price in periods of low demand. This, latter condition can only be true provided that Kc C D(P) in equilibrium. Only then would the lower capacity choice reduce the current incentive to defect in low demand states, and thus have the potential for raising the sustainable cooperattve low-demand price. However, such a reduction in cooperative capacity below K"/2 will clearly not be optimal provided that, given cooperative capacity Kc -L&/2, the sustainable low-demand price P is sufficiently close to the fully collusive price P. Under this condition, the cost of lower capacity in tents of foregone high-demand profit will outweigh the benefit in terms of increased profit in the low demand state.
While noting that the qualitative nature of our results would be preserved for any cooperative capacity choice Kc < I'/2 provided only that perfect price collusion given K" is not sustainable, for ease of exposition We choose to restrict our attention to the case where is "close to" Pr 20 in equilibrium. Thus, in deriving the most cooperative equilibrium for the Linus we set cooperative capacity at -K"/2.
We begin by characterizing the most cooperative price function taking the present discounted gains from maintaining future cooperation w as fixed. Recall that, for Kc -I/2, the most cooperative price sustainable in high demand states is the fully collusive price
At this price, each finn sells its capacity KC -gM/2 Thus, the only incentive a finn might have to defect would cone from deviating to a higher price, which can never be profitable given cooperative capacity Kc_ KM/2 since finns face positive marginal revenue (and zero marginal cost) in high demand states. Hence, defection in high demand states is not an issue.
Consider, then, a firm's current incentive to defect from the cooperative price P in a period of low demand. If a firm defects, it will do so by shaving its price below and capturing the entire market (recall that (9) ensures that Kc t DL(P k 0)). Its current gains from defection are then given by
• D(P) Assuming that the perfectly collusive outcome is not sustainable in the low demand state, the most cooperative low demand price P will satisfy
-w 2 where w is for now taken as a parameter. Explicit calculation yields
Therefore, the most cooperative price function as a function of w is given
The higfri price satisfying (38) is strictly greater than P (see (26)). Therefore, the optimal defection price (Fe) would lie below this price by a discrete amount, and the gains from defection would be higher than . As such, this price can be eliminated because it is not, in fact, sustainable as a cooperative price.
22
While (39) gives the most cooperative pricing function P as a function of the present discounted gains from maintaining the cooperative arrangement into the infinite future ca is in fact itself a function of P. Thus, the next step is to solve for the fixed point , where "''s denote most-cooperative equilibrium magnitudes. The fixed point, ,
ensures that the P supported by i yields present discounted gains from maintaining the cooperative arrangement into the infinite future which are in fact equal to t.
To solve for , first note that w is defined as 6 (40) a --[Efl(i,It.P) -EIt(i,K",P)).
1-6
where 6c(C,l) is the discount factor. Explicit calculation allows (40) to
Solving for the fixed point of (41) yields
- 
-lip
Hence, the assumption chat the fully collusive capacity choice gM,2 is sustainable in equilibrium amounts to placing restrictions on S and p (given by (46)) which ensure that p is not too large Intuitively, the current incentive for a firm to defect to a higher capacity will be small provided that the likelihood of a high demand realization (p) is low, since only in high demand states would this defection pay off. Hence, with the probability of high demand realizations not too large, the collusive difficulties of fins will be restricted to their ability to maintain high prices in low dentand states, Finally, putting (45) and (46) together yields the following bounds on 6 as a function of p which, if satisfied, guarantee that (9) and the conditions that fl(Kc) S at 1<C_gM12 and that < will all be satisfied for a range of values of the remaining parameters °a ' $, and In this section we introduce antidumping law into the domestic country and explore the way in which the tacit collusive equilibrium of the previous section is affected when the domestic firm is given the opportunity to bring antidumping suits against its foreign rival. We begin with a brief description of the relevant aspects of U.S. antidumping law.
DescriDtion of 1) S. Antidurfiping Law
Antidumping law has had a long and complex legislative history in the U.S. which we do not attempt to review here. Instead, we provide a brief summary of the steps involved in a dumping case under current U.S. law, from initiating an antidumping duty investigation to the final determination and assessment of duties.10 We then attempt to distill the key elements of this process, with the aim of capturing these elements in our subsequent It should be reiterated here that we have imposed the condition that S at Kc_Rhl/2 only for ease of exposition. The qualitative nature of our results will hold for any sustainable cooperative capacity choice so long as (9) and the condition that < are satisfied. that is, to decide whether the petition is in order and, if so, to commence an investigation.'' The ITA must notify the ITC promptly of its petttion determination. If affirmative, the ITC then has 45 days to make a 'preliminary determination" based on the "best available information" (typically that supplied by the petitioner) of whether there is reason to believe that the industry under review is "materially injured' or 'threatened with material injury" or that the establishment of the industry "is materially retarded" as a result of imports. If the ITC's preliminary determination is negative, the investigation is terminated. Provided that the ITC's preliminary determination is affirmative, And within 160 days of the initial filing of the suit (or within 90 days if all interested parties agree to a "waiver of verification"), the ITA must make a "preliminary determinations of whether there is reasonable evidence that merchandise "is being sold, or is likely to be sold at less than fair value.
12
A negative preliminary determination by the ITA does not terminate the investigation.
However, if the preliminary determination of the ITA is affirmative, it must provide an estimate of the "dumping margin," and is then required to order the "suspension of liquidation" of the affected imported goods and the '' Petitions can be either "self-initiated" by the ITA or initiated by an "interested party" on behalf of the industry. The former is by far the exception, with the most promirent example being the Trigger Price Mechanism 12
In "extraordinary complicated" cases, the ITA may postpone making its preliminary determination until the 210th day after filing. Under "extraordinary circumstances," an agreement by the accused foreign firms to eliminate the "injurious effect" of their actions may be sufficient to suspend the investigation.
' The IT?. may postpone its final determination until the 135th day after its preliminary determination if requested to do so by either the petitioner or the firms against which the dumping allegations were made. 28 preliminary determination was affirmative, then the TIC must make its final determination of injury within 45 days of the ITAs final determination (or within 120 days of the hA's preliminary determination, whichever is later). If the ITA's preliminary determination was negative, and its final determination is affirmative, then the TIC has 75 days from the ITA's affirmative final determination to make its final determination of injury.
Lastly, if the final determinations of both the ITh and TIC are affirmative. the ITA has 1 days within which to instruct customs officers to assess the appropriate antidumping duties. If either the ITC or the ITA determination is negative, the investigation is terminated.
As is evident from this brief review, foreign firms have ample opportunity during the course of the investigation to take actions which either terminate or suspend the proceedings. The former requires reaching agreement over price (and quantity) with petitioners, i.e., domestic producers, while the latter requires reaching agreement with the ITA. A third option for foreign firms is simply to 'behave,' so that the final dumping determination is negative. In this regard, Prusa (1988) filing of antidumping suits might be viewed as a mechanism by which domestic firms can alter the incentives of foreign firms to aggressively pursue domestic market share. In particular, by filing a petition at the beginning of a period in which dumping is likely to be a problem, the domestic industry can assure that dumping by foreign firms wilt be met by antidumping duties applied to that period's sales.15 This characterization of antidumping law motivates the modeling approach we pursue below.
Modelin antidumoin law
For the purposes of the formal model, we take dumping by the foreign firm to be synonymous with a defection from the cooperative price, i.e. cutting its price to steal market share from the home firm. With the above discussion as our guide, we model antidumping law as providing the home firm with the opportunity to change the foreign firm's payoff in the event of a foreign defection from the cooperative price. Specifically, for the cost of filing the suit, the home firm is able to assure that a foreign defection from the cooperative price will be met by an antidumping duty in the period in which defection takes place.'' 16 We abstract in this characterization from any "noise' in the IrA/nC decision and assume that an antidumping duty is imposed if and only if dumping has occurred. Accordingly, we also abstract from the foreign fin's cost of defending itself during the antidumping proceedings.
17 If the punishment (antidunping duty) were delayed until the period after a defection is observed, the basic arguments of this section would still carry through though in a less transparent way.
Note also that we have chosen to proceed as if the introduction of domestic antidumping law would have no impact on the static Nash equilibriun derived earlier. and thus have assumed that the presence of domestic antidumping law has no impact on firm payoffs in the punishment phase of the dynamic game. It can be shown that antiduaping suits will in fact never be filed in the static Nash equilibrium (and thus that the static Nash payoffs remain unchanged 30 We now amend the dynamic model studied above and introduce antidumping law into the home country. The timing of moves in the game is as follows.
As before, at the beginning of any period, firms simultaneously set capacity K and K* facing per unit capacity costs r>O, after which the state of demand is revealed. It is at this point that the home firm now has the option of filing an antidumping suit against the foreign firm at a filing cost F>O.
With the decision of whether or not to file common knowledge the firms then simultaneously set prices for the period.
Consider first the high demand state. Since the potential benefits for the home firm associated with filing a suit stem from relaxing the incentive constraint of the foreign firm, it is clear that a suit will never be filed in the high demand state, as long as F>O. This is because in the high demand state the two firms already collude perfectly (the incentive constraints don't bind), so that paying a fee F to reduce the foreign firi's payoff in defecting from the cooperative price would yield no offsetting benefits to the home firm in the form of larger cooperative high-demand profits." Thus, the domestic firm will not file a suit in high demand when domestic antidunping law is introduced) provided that the finding of "material injury" requires an import surge greater than some fixed e > 0. and that dumping is deemed "inactionable" (with no duty forthcoming) if this minimum injury standard is not met. With this assumption, the results of Kreps and Scheinkman (1983) are unaffected by the introduction of domestic antidumping law, so that the law would have no impact on static Nash equilibrium payoffs for the domestic (and foreign) firm.
' One might argue that the asywmietric access to antidumping law enjoyed by the home firm would allow it to force" upon the foreign firm an asymmetric sharing of the cooperative (market) capacity K" + Kc*, perhaps with K° > I&. While asymmetric sharing of capacity can not be ruled out as a cooperative equilibrium, any such sharing agreement that entailed the filing of suits by the home firm in either or both states of demand would he Pareto dominated by the same sharing rule without filing (thus avoiding the filing cost F>O). Hence, one would not expect to see the filing of states for F>O, and cooperation in the high demand state is unchanged frot its description in the dynaic game of the previous section. Consider, then, the low demand state. If a suit is not filed by the home country.
nothing changes from the description of the low demand state given in the previous section. In particular; the most cooperative price sustainable with the threat of Nash reversion will be below the optimal collusive price in the low demand state (given our parameter assumptions). But with incentive constraints binding in the low demand state absent a suit (see (38)), filing a suit may. by altering the incentives of the foreign firm to defect from the cooperative price, relax its incentive constraint at the preexisting cooperative price and be worth its cost to the domestic firm by allowing greater collusion on low demand price. However, for this to happen, the incentive for the domestic firm to detect must be appeased as the cooperative price is raised, and the only way to accomplish this is to
give the domestic firm greater market share in low demand states. Hence, we now explore how the filing of a suit changes the incentives to defect from the cooperative price and the impact of these changes on cooperative price and market shares in the low demand state.
Defining S as the cooperative market share for the home firm in the low demand state and r as the ad valorem antidumping duty to be levied on antidumping suits emerge as part of a cooperative capacity sharing agreement. Asymmetric access to antidumping law therefore introduces no relevant asymmetry into the determination of the cooperative capacity shares. Thus, the logic of focusing on symmetric cooperative capacity choices Kc -I is unaffected by the presence or absence of antidumping law. Nevertheless, as we show below, asymmetric sharing of the market in low demand states (when capacity does not bind) will emerge in the mostcooperative equilibrium with the introduction of domestic antidumping law. Because of the asymmetry introduced by the existence of antidumping law in the domestic country, we now need to characterize separately the incentive constraints for both the domestic and the foreign firms. The no defection conditions which the cooperative low-demand price and market sharing rule must satisfy then become Ca and ' For simplicity we take the magnitude of the antidumping duty, if levied, to be fixed and not necessarily reflective of the true" dumping margin which would in this case be measured as the difference between and a 'constructed value" measure. Note also that while U.S. antidumping law provides for the imposition of antidumping duties on domestic imporcers rather than foreign exporters, it permits importers to be reimbursed by foreign exporters for the payment of dumping duties on all imports for which the agreement to purchase was made prior to the suspension of liquidation order and where the merchandise is exported before a determination of sales at less than fair value (see Dale. 1980, pp. 104-103, note 42) . Hence, as embodied in (49), we take the incidence of the antidumping duty to fall on the foreign exporter rather than the importer of foreign products. 
Solving for the fixed point of (54) and (55) then yields
To analyze the way in which the introduction of antidumping law in the domestic country effects the tacit collusive equilibrium in the absence of such law, we note first that the home firm can always choose not to file anc receive equilibrium expected discounted gains from tacit collusion equal to . Thus, the domestic firm will choose to file antidunping suits in low demand states if and only if (58) > that is, if (and only if) the domestic firms equilibrium expected 35 discounted gains from tacit collusion (net of filing costs) are greater by filing in low demand states than by not filing at all. Using (42) and (36).
it is straightforward to check that
Moreover, using (56), direct calculation establishes that ds1 (F0.i0) (60) > 0. If the petitioner is taken to suffer a loss of "good standing" with the ITC whenever it fails (after the initial salesat_lessthanfair.Value determination) to withdraw a suit which is ultimately rejected in the final determination, and if prices are set for the period by the time of the initial sates-at-less-than-fair-value determination, then equilibrium will have all suits end in withdrawal. Finally, we consider the mechanism through which the home firm gains more than the foreign firm from the existence of domestic antidumping laws, despite the fact that it is the home finn that must incur the filing costs This mechanism is the shifting of cooperative market share to the domestic fin in low demand states. To show that the domestic finn gains market share in low demand states as a result of filing the suit, we note that, using (54) and (5S), and substituting in (48) through (51). expression (62) implies that the equilibrium most cooperative market share for the domestic firm in low demand states, (r), satisfies 37 (64) (r) > provided only that w1 > w (so that filing occurs in low demand states).
Since cooperative market shares are symmetric in high demand states and symmetric in low demand states in the absence of antidumping law, (64) implies that the filing of an antidumping suit by the domestic firm in low demand states is accompanied by an increase in the cooperative market share of th. domestic firm. Such a shift in market share in the presence of antidumping suits is required in order to mitigate the incentive of the domestic firm to defect from price cooperation as the cooperative price is moved to the more collusive level facilitated by the suit. Hence, by facilitating both hi&ier collusive (low-demand) prices and greater domestic (low-demand) market share, antidumping law contains both rent-augmenting and rent-shifting elements.
Finally, while we have stressed the positive implications of our analysis: it is important to note here that the rent-shifting aspect of antidumping law is not sufficient to make it attractive as a policy for raising the sum of the expected present discounted value of domestic producer and consumer surplus in the industry.2' To see that this is true, note first that the introduction of domestic antidumping law leaves collusive capacity and collusive high-demand price unaffected, so that only the surplus in low-demand states need be considered. But the introduction
We ignore here the filing costs born by the domestic firm as well as any resource costs associated with the ITA/ITC procedures. Such costs would only strengthen the conclusion. 38 of antidumping law facilitates greater price collusion in low demand states. so that total market surplus (the sum of domestic consumer surplus, domestic producer surplus, and foreign producer surplus) must decline. Hence, a sufficient condition for the sum of domestic consumer and producer surplus in low demand states to fall with the introduction of domestic antidumping law is that foreign producer surplus not decline. This condition is guaranteed by (63). Thus, in spite of the domestic rent-shifting effects of the policy, the sum of expected discounted producer and consumer surplus at home must decline with the introduction of domestic antidunping law.
IV Conclusion
We have attempted in this paper to model the impact of domestic antidumping law on the behavior of domestic and foreign firms that are tacitly colluding in the domestic market. Our major conclusions can be summarized as follows. The filing of an antidumping suit can become a useful mechanism with which to enforce price collusion during periods when collusion is otherwise difficult to sustain. In particular, if firms face stochastic market demand and must install capacity before the resolution of this uncertainty, price collusion will be most difficult to sustain in periods of low demand, and it is in such periods that antidumping suits will tend to arise. By reducing the incentives of the foreign firm to defect from any collusive price, the filing of an antidumping suit by the domestic firm allows a greater degree of collusion (a higher price) to be sustained in low demand states, but only by shifting cooperative market share toward the domestic firm to appease its incentive to defect. As a consequence the introduction of antidumping law into the domestic country will result in the 39 filing of suits in low-demand states, and to higher low-demand prices, greater market share for the domestic firm in low-demand states, and greater expected discounted profits for foreign and domestic firms alike, all without the imposition of a single antidumping duty. However, once domestic consumer surplus is also considered, the domestic country must lose from the introduction of antidumping law.
While these results are strong and intuitive, they have come from a model which is highly stylized and special in a number of ways. We have simplified the analysis greatly by limiting the parameter space and restricting our attention to i.i.d. shocks to market demand. Future theoretical work must focus on the degree to which the strong insights whtch emerge from this model are preserved in more general settings.
Nevertheless. we feel that the positive predictions of even this simple model are sufficiently rich to allow meaningful empirical exploration of the relevance of our ideas for the workings of U.S. antidumping law in practice. This is especially true given the sharp predictions which emerge from a comparison of our results here with those in Staiger and Wolak (lg89) concerning the impact of market structure in the petitioning industry on the frequency with which antidumping petitions should end in the imposition Of duties. While both models predict the filing of antidumping suits in lowdemand states, in Staiger and Wolak (1988) we assume that the petitioning industry is perfectly competitive and find that antidumping suits against collusive foreign firms always end in duties, while our results here imply that when the petitioner is a member of the tacitly collusive (international) cartel the filing of antidumping suits serves a Eundenta1ly different purpose and antidunping duties are never actually 40 imposed. Taken together, these stylized findings suggest that the frequency with which antidumping petitions end in the imposition of duties should be higher for more competitive petitioning industries. We hope to test the empirical implications of these and other results in future work.
